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FAMILY LAW
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER

If this was not a year marked by the importance of decisions in family

law, it was a year in which a large number of curious issues were raised

and settled. This year provided answers to such questions as: whether a

non-resident mother-in-law is a member of the family for purposes of the

Family Court Act; whether an antenuptial agreement preceding an in
cestuous marriage is enforceable and, indeed, whether antenuptial agree

ments are enforceable at all because of anti-heart-balm legislation. Finally,

a definitive position has been taken on a husband's duty of support for his
wife's child conceived through artificial insemination.
Marriage.

It has been evident for some time that the New York courts

-

take a rather liberal view of the statutory provision declaring marriages

between uncle and niece void_ While it is clear that such a marriage validly

contracted elsewhere in the United States would be recognized in New

York,1 it was equally clear until this year that such a marriage contracted
in New York was, by operation of statute, void.2 A decision this year cast

some doubt on the latter rule. In Matter of Estate of Saffer,S the court held

an antenuptial agreement made prior to such a "marriage" in New York
State to be valid and enforceable. Since the validity of an agreement of

this sort depends on the validity of the proposed marriage, the court sug

gested that the parties might have gone out of the state to consummate a

valid marriage at any time in the future. The difficulty with this position,

in light of other cases holding an antenuptial agreement void when based

on a proposed bigamous marriage, is that, on the death of the first

spouse, it would be equally possible to effect a valid marriage. Alternatively,

it would be possible to obtain a divorce and then remarry. In point of fact,

in any case, the marriage would be void when contracted.

The case is in rather sharp contrast to another case which this year

assaulted the enforceability of antenuptial agreements generally.4

Marital Property .

The extent of the wife's ownership of property

-

connected with the marriage still raises a considerable problem. For ex
ample, consider joint bank accounts which, undoubtedly, are often opened
without serious consideration of the extent of interest in the fund by
husband and wife. ·When ownership of the fund is disputed, however, it is

di�tributed in accordance with the intention of the person who made the

George J. Alexander is Assistant Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College
of Law and a Member of the Illinois and New York Bars.
1. Matter of Estate of May, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953).
2. Audley v. Audley, 196 App. Div. 103, 187 N.Y. Supp. 652 (1st Dep't 1921).
3. 39 Misc. 2d 691, 241 N.Y.S.2d 681 (SUIT. Ct., Kings Co. 1963).
4. Wasserman v. Weisner, 36 Misc. 2d 916, 234 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962).

HeinOnline -- 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 369 1963-1964

SYRACUSE LAW REVIEW

370

deposit. Consequently, a wife is entitled to half of a joint account, even
if the husband has since withdrawn the entire fund, unless he can over
come the presumed intention of making a gift of one-half by the deposit.1S
The wife must also litigate the issue since the presumption is clearly
rebuttable.6
Even more difficult is the question of intention in the purchase of house
hold goods which are primarily useful in furnishing the marital home.
Here, it is even more difficult to look to the intention of the parties as a
means of determining property interests since their likely intention was
to use the property jointly during their marriage. Faced with this problem,
one court has given each a one-half interest.7 To further complicate the

matter, the husband is apparently entitled to immediate possession of his
property, even if it is a part of the marital residence, when he no longer
chooses to live with his wife. Indeed, this is true even when he wrongfully
abandons her.s In the interim between the abandonment and a court order
determining property rights and the extent of the duty of support, this
conclusion may leave a wife in an embarrassing position.

Paternity.-Few cases in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence have grappled
with the difficult problem of the paternity of a child born of artificial
insemination. New York has two such cases as of this year. Unfortunately,
they are diametrically opposed in theory. The case decided this year,

Gursky

v.

Gursky,9 refused the status of a legitimate child to an infant so

born, although it held the husband of the inseminated liable for the

child's support because of the husband's consent. In refusing the argument
that the child was entitled to support as a legitimate child of the marriage,
the case flies in the face of the other instance in which a judicial determin
ation of the status of such a child was made. In Strnad

v.

Strnad,tO the

court was asked to decide the right of visitation to be accorded the
husband who had consented to his wife's artificial insemination. The
court stated that the child was a legitimate child of the marriage. Not
finding this theory applicable on any of the grounds on which court legitima
tion may occur nor on any quasi-adoption theory urged by the prior court,

the court, in the Gursky case, found the rationale erroneous. It pointed out
that both legitimation and adoption are matters governed solely by statute
and that, consequently, the court has no power to initiate new theories of

legitimation. Certainly, the law provides no present answers, unless they

can be derived through court construction, for the status of a child born of
artificial insemination.

5. Russo v. Russo, 17 App. Div. 2d 129, 232 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1st Dep't 1962).
6. Florio v. Florio, 19 App. Div. 2d 526, 240 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1st Dep't 1963).
7. Tausik v. Tausik, 38 Misc. 2d 11, 235 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962).
8. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 17 App. Div. 2d 106, 232 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1st Dep't 1962).
9. 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1963).
10. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1948).
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The onus of illegitimacy remains as strong as ever. As at common law,
a court within this year has held than an illegitimate child is no-one's
child.ll The court found that the Welfare Department may not charge a
father with liability for support of his daughter's illegitimate child, al
though he is liable for her support and would presumably be liable as a
grandparent for the child's support were it legitimate.12 The case not only
is contra to another holding under a similar statutel3 but may be unsup
portable in theory as well. ,\Vhatever purpose the legislature had in allow
ing welfare indemnification would seem to support the right to indemnifica
tion in the case of illegitimate children. A broad reinvocation of the filius
nullius doctrine now may wash over into other contacts where the re
sults fall on less affluent risk bearers.
Under what circumstances may a married woman bring paternity pro
ceedings against

a

person not her husband? Under the Domestic Relations

Law, the answer was simple: A paternity action could be brought if the
child was born out of wedlock.14 That, in turn, required either that the
child be begotten and born out of wedlock or that the mother have been
separated from her husband by court order or for a period of one year
prior to the birth of the child.I5 If neither of these conditions applied, no
action would lie.16 A court this year reiterated the rule.17 Under the
present Family Court Act, however, the result is far from clear.18 Gone are
the provisions allowing an action based on judicial separation and those
making reference to a year's absence of the husband. A child is born out
of wedlock now only if he is born and begotten out of lawful matrimony.
If the old rationale applies and the section is still taken as governing, it
would seem that no paternity action would ever lie if the mother was
married. The result seems peculiar when one considers the retention of
the provision allowing husband and wife to testify to non-access in
paternity proceedings.19
In any event, what does one do under either statute when the child is
wnceived while the wife is married to a man who is not the father, and
born at a time when she has married the father? Following the analysis
suggested above, and conceivably also under the prior Domestic Relations
I I . McManus Y. Lollar, 36 Misc. 2d 1046, 235 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962).
12. N.Y. Soc. WeI. Law § 101 includes grandparent among those responsible. Cf.
Calhoun Y. Calhoun, 256 App. Diy. 672, 11 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dep't 1939).
13. Jones Y. Jones, 161 Misc. 660, 292 N.Y. Supp. 221 (N.Y. Dom. ReI. Ct. 1937)
(illegitimate child is "stepchild" for similar support liability).
14. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1925, ro. 225, § I; repealed, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 690.
15. Id. at § 119.
16. Matter of "Dunn," 203 Misc. 181, 115 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Child. Ct., Onondaga Co.
1952), aU'd, 281 App. Diy. 1068, 121 N.Y.S,2d 766 (4th Dep't 1953) (no paternity proceeding
though blood test excluded husband's paternity).
17. Lovelace v. A.rcieri, 17 App. Div. 2d 465, 235 N.Y.S.2d 501 (3d Dep't 1962).
18. See N.Y. Famlly Ct. Act art. 5.
19. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 531.
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Law,20 the child was legitimate as to the first husband and not the subject
of a paternity proceeding against the second. A court, however, had little
difficulty in holding the second husband to be the father.21 The policy
serving legitimation of children does not require an opposite result. None
theless, it would seem that in this area legislative clarification would be
appropriate.
The law has always required a rather high standard of proof to estab
lish paternity. The concept of protecting putative fathers, apparently

underlying the proof requirement, has gone unchallenged. Only rarely,

however, does one get a chance to review the factual standards which
actually apply. One such case came up this year, suggesting the possibility
that the standard may not be as vigorous in practice as in pronouncement.
In Lozano

v.

Platt,22 the appellate division reversed a lower court determina

tion of paternity. The dissenting justice found occasion to review the
evidence which he believed supported paternity: Petitioner bought mer
chandise where the respondent worked. She was ably to identify the type of
car respondent drove although wrong about its color. She alleged inter
course.

Separation, Support and Ali mony .

It may be that the courts this

-

year have created a level of separation below both the level of absolute
divorce and divorce from bed and board. It has always been reasonably

clear that, absent proof of one of the statutory grounds for separation, a

spouse is not entitled to a legal separation from the other spouse.23 How
ever, pending their reconciliation and their ability to "live happily ever
after,"24 the parties may remain apart.25 What was unclear until this year
was whether a court could immunize a party, who removed himself from
the marital residence, from a decree of separation based on his abandon
ment despite an inability to find grounds for separation. Gladstone

v.

Gladstone26 did just that. It found that, while the wife had not established

her right to a judicial separation based on cruelty and inadequate support,

the husband had not established his counterclaim based, in part, on
abandonment. The court concluded that the wife had proved enough to
estblish her right to live separately from her husband but not enough to
prove her right to a judicial separation. Presumably, having proved her
right to live separately the �ife is now immunized from a later suit based
on abandonment. If this is true, then it is submitted that the parties are
20. It is not clear from the case whether the mother and her earlier husband
cohabited when she became pregnant by the present husband.
21. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 18 App. Div. 2d 932, 238 N.Y.S.2d 349 (2d Dep't 1963).
22. 18 App. Div. 2d 1071, 239 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st Dep't 1963).
23. See Brighton v. Brighton, 38 Misc. 2d 479, 237 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.
1963).
24. Id. at 480, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
25. Ibid.
26. 35 Misc. 2d 206, 232 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962).
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if a decree of separation had issued

except, of course, that the financial aspects of this settlement are different.
On the related problem of separation agreements, the usual number of
cases found their way into court. Drafting proved,

as

in prior years, to be

one of the important stumbling blocks. Thus, in a dispute over a provision
to provide for the education of both Peter and Stephen the sum of twenty

dollars per week and for Richard the sum of ten dollars per week until
each shall attain the age of twenty-one, a court found that the agreement
unambiguously provided for the payment of fifty dollars per week rather
than the husband's contended thirty dollars.27
Surviving the chasm of drafting, a separation agreement must hurdle
the illegality provision embodied in Section 51 of the Domestic Relations

Law.::!8 This year the hurdle was raised. For one thing, a court held that the
parties may not agree to have the wife supported out of a portion of a
personal injury recovery not yet obtained, as such a provision (when the
exclusive provision for support) contravenes the husband's duty to provide
support for the wife.29 'Whatever merit there may be in allowing the wife
to attack such an agreement on these grounds, it is not clear why the
husband, having recovered in his personal injury action, should be able
to set up the "illegality" of the agreement as a defense. It should be noted,
however, that there were other grounds for the decision.
An even stranger application of the prohibition against contractually
removing the husband's duty to support arose in Lacks

v.

Lacks.30 In that

case, the Court of Appeals seemed to invalidate a reconciliation support
agreement, which provided handsomely for the wife, on the grounds that
it affected the husband's duty of support at a time when the parties were
living together. In so doing, the Court managed to invoke a principal
originally intended to keep husbands from financially inducing separation
in such

a

manner as to prevent husbands from financially inducing

reconciliation.31
Furthermore, the perennial problem of contracting to obtain a divorce
through a separation agreement received what may be a harsher treatment
than had been provided for many years. In Viles

v.

Viles,32 the separation

agreement entered into by the parties, and presumably entirely valid on
its face, was invalidated by the court on the ground that the negotiations
leading to it included the factor of the wife's obtaining a divorce. Ac
tually, there were two separation agreements. The first one, after the parties
become estranged, called for a level of support for less than half a year and
'27. Tremper v. Tremper, 35 Misc. 2d 846, 231 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.

196'2).
28.
'29.
30.
31.
32.

N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 51.
Taylor v. Taylor, 36 Misc. 2d 747, 233 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962).
12 N.Y.2d 268, 189 N.E.2d 487, 238 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1963).
See Comment, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 681 (1963).
36 Misc. 2d 731, 233 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962).
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an agreement on long range plans thereafter. The parties lived apart.
When the initial period of support expired, the husband agreed to pay a
somewhat higher level of support. Significantly, the husband also made a
payment designed to pay for the wife's trip to the Virgin Islands where
she proposed to obtain a divorce. Thereafter, she obtained the divorce.
The court in this action allowed the husband to repudiate the agreement.
If this case stands for the proposition that the husband's agreeing to pay

the expenses of the divorce constitutes a violation of Section 51 of the

Domestic Relations Law, or if it stands for the proposition that an agree·
ment to make increased support payments when the parties decide to di·
vorce is invalid, then it seems doubtful that many separation agreements
can survive court challenge. It should be remembered that the parties in
the instant case, unlike many other persons who have litigated their
separation agreements, had already separated and had, indeed, lived apart
for several months under an agreement which clearly did not envisage a
permanent separation. Having thereupon decided that their marriage
could not be saved, they contracted for a permanent support provision and
the wife went abroad for her divorce. It seems difficult on these facts to
find more of a taint in the agreement than that which normally accompa
nies separation agreements coupled with a party's divorce.
Where no separation agreement existed, the question of the extent of
the husband's duty to support was also the subject of the usual amount
of litigation. During this year a new provision in Section 51 of the Domestic
Relations Law became effective.s3 By clear implication, a wife might now,
under appropriate circumstances, be required to support her husband. No
case has as yet applied that provision. Wives were, however, in for their
share of judicial castigation. In refusing to increase alimony in one case,
the court made it clear that it had less than complete sympathy with the
petitioner's wife who, the court indicated, was now having trouble holding

her fifth husband.s4 In another case, the appellate division reduced even
temporary alimony against a wealthy man, in part because of a history of

prior marriages and the fact that the marriage on which the alimony order

had been based had only lasted a few months.s5 Another court, finding

itself disenchanted with the wife's claim, awarded her nothing when she
sought support payments following an annulment.so Finding that she had

a job and that there were no children, the court held that she might well

fend for herself.
Of course, not all husbands were appealing either, and another court
33. The gist of the provision is that husband and wife may not contract to rcmm'c
the wife's obligation to support the husband under certain circumstances. N.Y. Dom.
ReI. Law § 51.
34. KesseIer v. KesseIer, 236 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1963).
35. SaIzberger v. SaIzberger, 18 App. Div. 2d 991, 238 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1st Dep't 1963).
36. Fleck v. Fleck, 237 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1963).
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took an opportunity to berate, at some length, the "playboy" antic of a
husband who was seeking to avoid alimony on his lack of employment.
Needless to say, substantial alimony was awarded.37
As in other years, appellate courts have had to review the excessive
alimony granted by lower courts. Some instances arose in which the

appellate court had difficulty finding enough left after alimony to allow for
the husband's support. Such was the case in l'1ercier

v.

Mercier,3s where

the husband, whose earnings were primarily limited to salaries of about

521,500, was ordered to pay S16,000 per year to his wife.

It has always been a matter of discretion with the trial court to
determine the level of alimony appropriate to the circmstances. Conse
quently, the range of considerations going into any given award are dif
ficult to determine. At least one interesting consideration which may have
some novelty in alimony cases was raised this year. One court, in setting
the level of support in an application for increase from a prior alimony

decree, considered that the husband was in a better position to pay an
increased amount because he was living with another woman and claiming
her as his wife on his income tax return, thereby effecting the benefits of
a joint return.39 'Whether a comparable reduction will be allowed in the
future, should the government press for back ta.xes based on these false
returns, was not indicated. The same case has made another interesting
contribution to the law in its suggestion that the increased cost of living is,
by itself, a sufcient reason to increase alimony. The prior cases indicate
that an alimony decree cannot be changed unless the condition of the
parties changes. If an increase in the cost of living is a sufficient change in
condition, it would seem that few alimony decrees have any permanency
in a time of progressive inflation.
Even setting the amount of alimony is, of course, not the final court
action. Obtaining compliance with the decree is sometimes difficult. Jail
is often an unpalatable alternative. A carefully reasoned opinion reviewed
the advantages of payroll deductions from the husband's salary as an alter
native means of accomplishing the collection goa1.40

Afarriage Dissolution.-:Whatever may have been the case before, the
courts this year seem to have become stricter with respect to annulments.
Thus, a petitioner claiming to have been defrauded by a false claim of her
spouse's wealth was admonished for her credulity and denied an annul
ment.41 Even the usual unfulfilled promise to have children lost its ap
proval under unexceptional facts.42 It was more heartily disapproved when
37. Brandt v. Brandt, 36 Misc. 2d 901, 233 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962)
($10,400 pcr annum).
38. 18 App. Div. 2d 880, 237 N.Y.S.2d 428 (4th Dep't 1963).
39. Damsey v. Damsey, 39 Misc. 2d 385, 240 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1963).
40. "Doe" v. "Doe," 37 Misc. 2d 788, 234 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Family Ct., Bronx Co. 1962).
41. Avery v. Avcry, 236 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962).
42. Primmer v. Primmer, 37 Misc. 2d 589, 234 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct., Monroe Co.
1962).
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urged after ten years of marriage.43 No more favorable response was
achieved where the grounds were a breach of the promise to love and of a

contract of support.44

The effect of out-of-state divorces proved more consistent this year
despite previously discussed infirmities.45 Alabama divorces seemed im
mune from collateral attack. by a party before the Alabama court.46 An anal
ogous situation arose with respect to a Virgin Island divorce in which the

court refused to allow collateral attack. in the absence of a decision in the
Virgin Islands on the propriety of such attack..47

Mexican divorces have always raised problems of their own. Under
appropriate circumstances, New York courts will respect such divorces on
a comity principle, but this does not mean that they will be given the re
spect accorded under the doctrines of res judicata or full faith and credit
to a sister state decree. For example, mental derangement not rising to a
rather stringent standard is an inappropriate defense to a New York di

vorce action.48 Institutionalization of a woman for mental disease, how
ever, may persuade a New York court to deny validity to a Mexican divorce
when she denies the service of papers on her.49 When Mexican divorces
are of the "mail order" variety, they are afforded no status at all.5o As a
result, the New York decisions have been uniform in denying an injunc
tion against obtaining such a divorce on the ground of its apparent in
validity.51 However, this year saw a contrary result reached.52 The court
found itself able to distinguish its case from those that preceded it on the
ground that in prior cases the petitioner had achieved a separation order
in New York prior to the other's invocation of the jurisdiction of the Mexi
can court. Since the petitioner in the instant case had not achieved that
status, the court found her more in need of its equitable power. It is pos
sible that the result is more desirable than that achieved in the other cases

since it allows an earlier declaration of the invalidity of the Mexican de
cree. The distinction between it and the prior cases is, however, not very

useful. If the Mexican decree is invalid, the status of New York litigation
at the time that it is decreed would seem irrelevant.
43. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 35 Misc. 2d 890, 231 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.
1962).
44. Cantor v. Cantor, 234 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1962).
45. See Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 333,
334-36 (1962).
46. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 18 App. Div. 2d 34, 238 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1st Dep't 1963); Sommer
v. Sommer, 36 Mise. 2d 379, 232 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962); Greene v. Greene,
236 N.Y.S.2d 732 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1963).
47. Klarish v. KIarish, 19 App. Div. 2d 170, 241 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1st Dep't 1963).
48. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 773, 236 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.
1962). See Comment, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 677 (1963).
49. Donohue v. Donohue, 236 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co. 1962).
50. Marum v. Marum, 8 App. Div. 2d 975, 190 N.Y.S.2d 812 (2d Dep't 1959).
51. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955).
52. Fernandez v. Fernandez, 39 Misc. 2d 471, 240 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct., Bronx
Co. 1963).
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Condonation was put in issue by a number of cases this year. Two

cases seem to demonstrate the rule usually applied in separation cases: A

short period of time of continued cohabitation and intercourse does not

establish condonation53 while an extended period does.54 It was thought,

however, that in a divorce action any continued cohabitation after knowl

edge of adultery would invoke condonation to defeat the action. One case
this year suggests the contrary.55 Continued cohabitation for a period of

fifteen months during which the parties occupied the same bedroom was

held insufficient for condonation, at least in the absence of intercourse be
tween the parties. If the courts are attempting to encourage reconciliation,

the rule seems highly desirable.

Children.-Among the most important decisions concerning children

were those relating to the respective rights to the custody of children by

parents and by the state. One court ruled that the family court had power
to "place" a child in a state institution if it felt her to be a "person in

need of supervision," even if she had not committed an act which, if done

by an adult, would constitute a crime.56 Thus, it appears that the loss of
the power to "commit" to a state institution57 in such cases is largely a

euphemistic change. Another court was equally clear, however, that the
family court is at least a necessary intermediary.58 Thus, whatever the right
of peace officers to apprehend a iuvenile, this right does not extend to his

indefinite detention without a family court proceeding.

Another difficult problem, long vexing the courts, has been the prob

lem of the rights of the natural mother to a return of her child from

others. Her relative power, where the child is being held by foster parents,

has been previously examined.59 Her position vis-a.-vis an "authorized

agency" or the "\Velfare Department has not been spelled out as thor
oughly. In both cases, either by contract or statute, a mother normally

agrees to a termination of her maternal rights by the initial placement.6o

The cases suggest, however, that neither the contract nor the statute will
be strictly followed in this respect, and that the determinative question
will be the ability of the mother to provide a fit home for the child.61 It

53. Fusaro v. Fusaro, 236 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.), 18 App. Div. 2d 714,
237 N.Y.S.2d 989 (2d Dep't 1962).
54. Takagi v. Takagi, 38 Misc. 2d 476, 237 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 1963).
55. Miller v. Miller, 237 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962);
56. Matter of "Doe," 36 Misc. 2d 611, 232 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Family Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962).
57. The Family Court Act limits the permissible orders for persons in need of
supervision to discharge, suspended judgment, probation and placement. N.Y. Family
Ct. Act § 754.
58. People ex reI. Johnson v. Michael, 39 Misc. 2d 365, 240 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. Co. 1963).
59. See Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 333,
34042 (1962).
60. The authority for both types of relinquishment is N.Y. Soc. WeI. Law § 383. A
common type of "contract" is contained in People v. Free Synogogue Child Adoption
Comm., 194 Mise. 332, 85 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1949).
61. See, e.g., People v. Free Synogogue Child Adoption Comm., supra note 60.
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may be, however, that the fit home which she must provide will be judged
on very demanding psychiatric standards.62
In a year which was marked by an increased testing of Negro rights
in many areas, family law was not exempt. In Rockefeller

v.

Nickerson,63

the court was asked to intervene in a denial of a petition by white parents
to adopt a Negro child. The petitioners alleged a 'Welfare Department
policy to deny interracial adoption which the department denied. Finding
sufficient basis for the denial as an exercise of discretion in the best inter
ests of the child, and giving credence to the department's denial of a racial

policy, the court avoided a holding on the question whether an adoption
may be denied solely on a racial basis, although it did, by way of dictum,
adopt an out-of-state case holding that it may not. It would be peculiar if,

in a state in which a child must be placed with parents of its religious
faith,64 and in which parent-child matching is attempted in fine detail on
a number of other criteria, race were an insignificant distinction. An ap
propriate resolution would seem to be not greater matching but an aban
donment of the present requirement of religious matching in favor of the
criterion adopted by this and other courts generally; that is, the best in
terests of the child.
The right of children to bring suit against their parents was as
abridged this year as it was previously.65 Indeed, it may have become a bit
more abridged by a holding that a child, who was adopted at the time of
suit but not at the time of the tort, could not bring an action against his
parents.66 Other children were barred in their suit against a foster father,
not on the basis of the inter-familial tort immunity, but because of New
York heart-balm legislation.67 These children were the donee beneficiaries
of an antenuptial agreement made by their mother with her present hus
band. As part of his obligation he had agreed to bestow certain favors on
her children, among them a million dollar trust for each. VVhen he reneged,
the children sued. The court found the agreement unenforceable, in part
because it tended to alienate the children from their natural father whose
support they renounced on discovering their claim to greater wealth. Pri
marily, however, the court held the agreement to be in contravention of

the New York statute against heart-balm actions. The reasoning appears

to be that the failure to provide the support agreed on for the children
was a breach of the antenuptial contract (although the marriage took
place). The antenuptial contract was reduced to its basis, a contract for
62. Mittenthal v. Dumpson, 37 Misc. 2d 502, 235 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Family Ct Bronx
Co. 1962). See Comment, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 679 (1963).
63. 36 Misc. 2d 869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962).
64. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 1 I 3.
65. See Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 333.
342-43 (1962).
66. Isabella v. Isabella, 19 App. Div. 2d 540, 240 N.Y.S.2d 945 (2d Dep't 1963).
67. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 80-84.
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marriage. Breach of a contract for marriage was not actionable because
of the anti-heart balm legislation.68 One wonders, if this decision should
prove correct, whether any suit can be brought on an antenuptial agree

ment.

The Family Court Act.-A year under the New York Family Court
Act has apparently brought more questions than answers. Many problems
remain to be resolved.G9 Perhaps one of the greatest problems, however, is
the fact that the new family courts have not in all instances complied with
the clear sections of the law designed to protect the rights of individuals.
Unfortunately also, the appellate courts have not demanded a rigorous
compliance with those aspects of the law but have dealt with the question
of compliance in terms of the prejudice to the de£endant.70 It may well be

that such rulings are more explainable in terms of the novelty of the act
than of the ultimate position of the court. If not, however, many of the
salutory provisions of the act will be swept away by the argument of lack
of prejudice to the respondent.
One of the most novel areas in the Family Court Act is the provision
for family offense proceedings, which are apparently the civil counterpart
for what would otherwise be criminal proceedings.71 Much remains to be
discovered about these proceedings. A few answers, however, are available.
For one thing, whatever the act may say with respect to the jurisdiction of
the family court over assault generally,72 the supreme court has been quick
to point out that its jurisdiction over a felony assault remains unchanged
and that the family court has no jurisdiction in this area.73 This leaves
misdemeanor assault to be handled by the family court for members of the
family and raises the rather interesting question of who is a member of
the family. 'What about a non-resident mother-in-law? One court gave her
familial status.74
68. Wasserman v. Weisner, 31'\ Misc. 2d 916, 234 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1962).
69. See Note, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 481 (1963).
70. Fasolo v. Probation Dep't, 19 App. Div. 2d 775, 241 N.Y.S.2d 873 (4th Dep't
1963) (mem.).
71. N.Y. Family Ct. Act art. 8.
72. "Any criminal complaint charging
an assault between . . . members of the
same family
shall be transferred by the criminal court
to the family court
N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 813.
73. Ricapito v. People, 38 Misc. 2d 710, 238 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1963).
74. People v. Keller, 37 Misc. 2d 122, 234 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Dist. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962).
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